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Imagining the Law
James Boyd White

My aim in this paper is to trace out a certain line of thought about
what it might mean to think of law rhetorically. 1 In doing this I shall
be resisting the impulse, quite common in our culture, to see the law
from the outside, as a kind of intellectual and social bureaucracy;
rather I am interested in seeing it from the inside, as it appears to
one who is practicing or teaching it. Throughout I shall conceive of
the law as a system of discourse that the lawyer and judge must
learn and use, and of which we can ask what meanings it creates
or enables us to create-for our individual and collective lives.
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Ways of Imagining the World

I wish to begin with the basic point that as human beings we per
petually imagine and reimagine the world and reflect what we imagine
in the ways we talk. If I start to talk or write about an academic
institution, for example-about Amherst College, say, or the Uni
versity of Michigan-I will immediately begin to define that insti
tution in a certain way: as a place where classes are given, or where
The discussion of the poetry of Robert Frost is drawn in part from my book, "This
Book of Starres": Learning to Read George Herbert (Ann Arbor: University of Michi
gan Press, 1994).
1. For especially valuable work on the way we imagine the world, see Kenneth
Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1956), and Northrop Frye, The Educated Imagination (Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, 1964). For a fuller statement of my general views on
rhetoric and law, see "Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life,"
in James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of Law
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), chap. 2.
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young people complete their growing up, or as a competitor with
other institutions, athletically or intellectually, or as the grantor of
certain credentials. I cannot help imagining a past, as well as a future,
for actors such as these-the roots of Amherst College in a nineteenth
century reaction to the godless unitarianism of Harvard, for example,
or of the University of Michigan in its early commitment to a new
idea of the possibilities of graduate education. Often, of course, I
will be unaware that the way I talk reflects a particular way of
imagining. Usually I just talk, as though the world were the way I
imagined it, and there were nothing problematic in my speech. But
whatever we may consciously think, in fact all of us are constantly
imagining the world.
It is also true, though perhaps less obviously so, that when we
talk or write we imagine both our audience and ourselves, and again
this is so whether or not we are aware of it. I think of myself as
simply giving a lecture, for example, or teaching a class, my students
as simply attending one, as if all this were instantly comprehensible,
not in the least odd nor the proper object of critical attention; yet
these are in fact peculiar social practices, which people differently
situated from us might find most odd.
Despite our usual inattention to them it is possible to make our
ways of imagining the world, and our action within it, the object of
reflection. In fact, one of the functions of great literature, and I shall
argue of the law as well, is to do just this, to make conscious, and
thus render the object of critical examination, the ways in which our
speech imagines at once a larger world that we claim to inhabit and
an immediate world we create with our audiences.
Consider for example this brief poem by Robert Frost:

[To view this SRHP, refer to
the print version of this title.]
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Many things happen in this poem, of course, but among them the
speaker of the poem imagines the world a certain way, or finds himself
wanting to do so: he wants to think of the flower, and the bird, and
the butterfly as being like him, as actors with feelings with which
he can identify-feelings of safety, danger, sympathy with others,
feelings that will confirm the reality and importance of his own. He
tries, that is, to imagine nature as a world of fellow feeling.
As he does this he finds himself imagining the world in another
way as well: the bird, it turns out, is wholly indifferent to the fate
of the flower, as is the butterfly too, and to neither has the stained
human breast any significance at all. This is not a universe of creatures
like us, then, full of the capacity for sympathy and themselves the
proper objects of our sympathies, but one of mysterious actors, each
driven by its own needs.
But the poem does not stop here. It goes on to suggest that this
way of imagining may be wrong as well: perhaps these animals and
plants are like us after all, but not benign, as the speaker at first
imagines it, but malign: think of the spider running to "greet the fly:'
The poem thus first imagines a world of significant and sympathetic
action, then throws that way of imagining life into doubt, and does
this in two ways, seeing its actors first as inscrutable, then as malign.
In doing so it makes its real subject the process of imagining the
world itself: it is the competing imaginings that become the topic of
thought and feeling.
This is frequent in Frost: think of the white-tailed bird that the
narrator pursues in "The Woodpile," and to which he attributes the
vanity of taking "everything said as personal to himself"; or of the
two voices countering one another in "West Running Brook"-hers
playful, full of fun and imagination, his ponderous, sententious, and
self-important; or of the two actors in "Mending Wall;' one committed
to one reiterated sentence-"something there is that doesn't love a
wall"-the other to another, "good fences make good neighbors." In
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each of these poems different ways of imagining the world are con
trasted with each other and thus made the object of critical reflection
and ultimate uncertainty.
Or think of Emily Dickinson's poem, "A Narrow Fellow:' As you
remember, this poem begins with the speaker imagining the snake
running through the grass as a kind of social being, a friendly chap:
A narrow Fellow in the Grass
Occasionally rides You may have met Him - did you not
His notice sudden is But by the end of the poem the speaker's efforts to domesticate and
familiarize this experience have failed:
Several of Nature's People
I know, and they know me I feel for them a transport
Of cordiality -

Copyright © 1994. University of Michigan Press. All rights reserved.

But never met this Fellow
Attended, or alone
Without a tighter breathing
And Zero at the Bone How does each of these writers imagine herself or himself, the
reader, and the kind of relation between them that the poem creates?
Each poem defines its writer as a person partly captured by the ways
of imagining the world implicit in the languages, in the verbal ges
tures, by which he or she has learned to negotiate the world; yet
also as one interested in bringing this circumstance to consciousness.
The reader too is defined as one who imagines the world and wants
to come to terms with the implications of the ways in which he or
she does so.
The Law as Machine

I mean all this as a way of defining the question implied in my title,
How do we imagine the law? Or, to put it more precisely, what ways
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of imagining the law do we have, and how do we choose among
them? With this question goes a second: In imagining the law in one
way or another, how do we imagine ourselves and our audience and
the relation between us? I am trying to think, that is, of all speech
as a kind of imagining, and this in two dimensions, as we imagine
the larger world, and as we imagine the immediate world in which
our language is a form of action.
My impression is that law is usually imagined, by those outside
of it, and by many of those who teach it as well, as a machine: a
machine that is part of another machine, the Government, which in
turn is part of another machine, Society, which is part of another
machine, Nature, until we get to the greatest machine of all, the
Universe. Sometimes this image is used rather explicitly, when we
speak of law as a "tool for social control" or "an instrument for
achieving social objectives," sometimes less so. But very often, at
least, I think that what is imagined is a set of parts that function in
interrelationship, by cause and effect. To think of something as a
machine-whether society, law, or the natural world-is to imagine
it as in principle wholly comprehensible by human intelligence and
subject to human control. Machines, after all, are made by people;
if they do not work correctly, they can be remade, or refashioned.
In this vision the law is the set of rules that govern a part of
the social machine; they could in theory govern all of it, but for
reasons of practicality or principle they govern only part. So imag
ined, the law works by establishing a set of prohibitions and com
mands, enforced by incentives and disincentives. Of course there are
imperfections in the process by which they function, but these defects
arise from our temporary want of knowledge, from the inherent
defectiveness of the language in which the law's commands are cast
(for it cannot be perfectly precise), or from the defectiveness of human
beings themselves. They are not inherent in the idea of law as
machine, and they can be minimized.
The fact that the natural world and the social world, the indi
vidual actor and the law, and language itself, are all imagined as
machines gives an extraordinary coherence to this vision of the world.
In particular, it makes it natural to think that the mode of reasoning
by which it works is a form of universal rationality : namely, reasoning
as the maker of the machine does reason, in terms of the specification
of ends to be obtained and the means by which they are to be
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accomplished. True reasoning meets the standards of an intellectual
machine. Its parts fit together to work in ways that can be rendered
wholly explicit in language, which is of course another machine.
Other forms of mental life and expression-for example, poems or
novels or music-are not "reasoning;' but something less, or different.
On this view the principal question for the lawyer or the student of
law is what policies should be adopted, that is, what value choices
should be made and how they should be put into effect, given our
various constraints. Once a choice of value is made, law is simply
a system of implementation. Laws are rules that work, or don't work;
the main issue is compliance, and here is the role for legal expertise,
namely how to secure it, or how to evade it. Lawyers are either
architects or engineers for a social machine.
This image of the world, and of the law, is so deeply seated in our
culture-it was promoted by the politics of the New Deal, and is
still advanced by forces within the social sciences, from sociology to
economics-that it is often hard to recognize that it is, after all, just
one way of imagining among many. I do not mean that one ought
never imagine the law this way: important conversations can be based
upon it and we would be worse off if we never talked this way. But
I do mean that this is only one way of talking among several, and
that it actually has rather less to do with what lawyers and judges
and citizens-do in the world than one might think.
What is more, it has a serious internal difficulty, namely that,
however powerful this vision may be for everything else, it cannot
account for itself. For how can this vision account for our own thought
and speech 7 Are we machines too 7 It certainly does not feel like it;
and whenever we talk we make claims for attention, for the value
and meaning of what we say, that are radically inconsistent with any
conception either of us or of our audience as machines. If "we" are
outside the machine we observe, how are we imagined: as analyzers,
makers, and designers of machines? Where do we come from? If we
are to have a vision that claims to be global it had better be one
that includes us.
The Law as Rhetoric

How else might one imagine the law? My suggestion is that it can
be imagined as a rhetorical and literary process, as an activity of

Copyright © 1994. University of Michigan Press. All rights reserved.

IMAGINING THE LAW

35

speech and the imagination that takes place in a social world that
can be imagined that way too-including our own performances with
language and each other, including indeed this very paper.
It may help the reader who is not a lawyer to see how this might
be done if you were to imagine yourself not outside the law, observing
it, but inside it, doing what lawyers and judges and legislators actually
do. Think, to begin with, of what you would expect to learn if you
went to law school. You might imagine that the law consists of a set
of rules, to be found in the books and applied to facts as they come
up, in lawyers' offices or in judges' courts. If so, the function of law
school would be to attain a comprehensive knowledge of those rules.
This is in fact part of what happens in law school and in the
law, but rather a small part. Sometimes of course a person will be
told by a lawyer simply what the law requires; in such a case it may
make sense to imagine her as simply functioning as a part of a social
machine, doing what some external authority commands. But actually
very little of the lawyer's life consists of this kind of work. In any
real case there may be dozens or hundreds of rules, or other author
itative texts, that arguably bear upon it. Some of them will be too
clear for argument, but many others will not, and it is upon these
upon the uncertainties in the authoritative texts that bear upon a
case-that the lawyer's attention is largely devoted.
Think, for example, of the First Amendment, which says: "Con
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press:' Does this mean that laws punishing libel, or conspiracy,
or incitement to murder, or pornography, or racial insults-which
could all be seen as forms of speech-are invalid? The word "inter
pretation" hardly does justice to what is called for here: a process of
thought and argument not only about words and context, but about
the meaning of a nearly infinite variety of human activities.
The lawyer's task is not just to apply rules in a mechanical way,
then, but to learn how to think and argue about their meaning, not
simply as words but as texts given significance by their contexts.
What the lawyer is to learn in law school is not merely a structure
of rules-in fact that is a very small part of what she learns-but
how to engage in argument of a certain sort, especially in argument
about the meaning of a set of authoritative texts: constitutions, stat
utes, judicial opinions, regulations, contracts, and any other text that
may be called upon as legally authoritative in a case.
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Why do I speak of "authoritative" texts? Because one charac
teristic of legal thought is that in every legal case the lawyers invoke
authorities external to themselves as the ground upon which it should
be resolved. Of course policy choices must be made by judges and
others, but this is always done in the context of a process in which
the decider looks outside of herself for her source of authority. In
deciding a case, that is, the judge looks not simply to her sense of
what would be best, but to what is called for by a text external to
her: a constitution, or a statute, or a contract written by the parties.
Formally speaking, at least, this is always true. Even where judges
ultimately conclude that a particular matter is open for their choice,
they traditionally think of that choice not as wholly free, but as
shaped by guides and constraints external to them, in the law or
culture, not by their personal preferences, say, or by drawing lots.
At its heart the law is a system of textual authority. 2 This is what
we mean both by the rule of law and by a Constitution that separates
the powers it creates.
For the lawyer, all this is a radically rhetorical process, in pre
cisely the sense in which Aristotle defines the term in his treatise on
rhetoric: It is the art of "finding out the available means of persuasion
in a given case." What is to count as a means of persuasion is to be
determined not by "logic" but by knowledge of the relevant audience
and its culture. This too Aristotle knew, and much of his treatise is
devoted to a catalogue of the argumentative claims that were, in his
judgment, effective in his world. The lawyer, therefore, must learn
the ways in which lawyers and judges think, so that he can speak
to them effectively. This is what law school is about.
These brief words about legal education reflect a way of imagining
the law not as a machine but as a set of people talking. The law
2. With legislators it works somewhat differently: they do look to the United
States Constitution to see if they are within their competence to act, and, if they
are state legislators, they will look at their own constitution and federal legislation
as well, much as judges do. But if they are within their competence they may, with
few exceptions, act on any ground they choose, and in any event need not explain
themselves to any one. This is what the writers of the Federalist Papers meant when
they said that legislation is a matter of will, adjudication of judgment. Thus in arguing
to a legislature the lawyer will address an audience less constrained by texts external
to it; in arguing to a court, the constraints provide the terms in which argument
proceeds.
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establishes the conditions upon which this special kind of talk goes
on, both by defining its places and occasions and by establishing its
resources, its terms, and its practices-in the largest sense creating
its language. Much of the life of the law is the reading of prior texts
claimed to be authoritative, listening to arguments about those claims
and about the meaning of those texts, and making arguments of both
kinds oneself. This is itself not a scientific process, nor readily describ
able in scientific terms, but a rhetorical and literary one.
One of the effects of this process, indeed I think one of the aims
we can attribute to it, is the maintenance of the language or discourse
in which the process itself proceeds. When two lawyers represent
opposing parties in a particular case, each undertakes to say every
thing that can be said, or can persuasively be said, on his or her
side; the result is that between them the lawyers mark out the pos
sibilities for speech in this situation. The lawyers disagree, of course
that is the point-but they cannot disagree about everything. Some
things are unsayable in any language; some claims cannot be made
in the language of the law. In thus articulating and prosecuting their
disagreements, the lawyers perform their agreement to everything
else, including the language in which their disagreement is defined.
In this sense one social function of the practice of law is the main
tenance of a culture, a culture of argument.
In the process, the language is not merely maintained, it is both
criticized and transformed. Both the lawyers and their audiences are
led to become at least somewhat self-conscious about the nature of
the languages they speak, of the language games they engage in, and
they find themselves forced to make judgments about their propriety
as well.
In this way the law works rather as poetry does-at least the
poetry of Frost or Dickinson-to make conscious, and thus the object
of critical thought, the languages we use. And since the language of
law is in principle subject to modification and transformation, no
particular mode of thought is taken as absolutely valid or authori
tative. It is all open to question and reexamination. This means,
among other things, that there is no stable or fixed language in which
bureaucratic "ends" can unquestionably be stated.
To imagine law as rhetorical, then, is to think of it not as a
machinelike process of cause and effect, driven by a rationality that
is fundamentally instrumental in kind, but as a discourse maintained
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by the processes of persuasion and argument. These processes work
not simply by ends-means rationality but by all the movements of
mind and feeling that lawyers and judges display. One of the ends
and effects of the law is the simultaneous maintenance and trans
formation of the culture it defines.
But there is more to it even than this. For while the law works
as a system of discourse, this does not happen in isolation but in
interaction with the other systems of discourse that make up our
world. Law is a language that must establish relations with virtually
all of the other languages spoken in our world: scientific and technical
talk, psychological and sociological language, the speech habits of
the parties and the witnesses, and so forth. The relationship is one
of translation, for each of these other discourses is translated into
the law. This is itself an activity calling for the highest sort of art,
by which the law must maintain its character as a meeting ground
for other systems of speech.
Finally, it is not merely a language that the law maintains, but
an entire social and dramatic system, a set of speakers and actors.
Indeed one feature of legal thought is that the power to decide is
allocated among various actors, each of whom has a particular and
limited role, no one of whom has plenary power. Thus the judge, or
regulator, or private citizen, or legislator, or governor or president,
must all ask when facing a particular legal question-about the valid
ity of a law prohibiting abortions, say-not only what they think
of the question in the abstract but whether, under our system, the
question is one for them to decide at all, and if so under what
standards. This set of questions, institutional and procedural in kind,
is at work, though sometimes only implicitly, in every legal conver
sation. The authoritative legal text in this way creates a social universe
that works at once competitively and cooperatively.
I mean the term "rhetoric;' then, to call attention to four features
of legal discourse: that its modes are not those of scientific reasoning;
that it works by persuasion; that it maintains and transforms its
culture; and that it is socially and institutionally constitutive. 3
3. In Heracles' Bow I say that the study of "constitutive rhetoric" is the study
of "the ways we constitute ourselves as individuals, as communities, and as cultures,
whenever we speak.... The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its
persuasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it commends" (35).
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The Rhetoric of Writing Law

The rhetorical structure of legal discourse might be summed up this
simple way: in a legal proceeding a rule (or other prior text) must
be selected, read, and applied to the case. Two key features «re
therefore the composition of the rule (or other authoritative text) and
the reading of it, both of which are open to argument. At the end
of the process other texts will be created: settlement agreements,
judicial opinions, administrative orders, which in turn become author
itative texts. From time to time the legislature too adds its texts to
those that already speak.
To think of the law this way will affect one's sense of what is
called for at every stage of the legal process. One can start with the
writing that a lawyer does, and in its most lawlike form: the making
of rules. On the view suggested here the rule will be conceived of
less as a command that is to be obeyed or disobeyed than as a way
of establishing and guiding the conditions of other people's rhetorical
activities. Like every text the rule requires for its operation the coop
eration of others, and the task for the writer of such a text is how
to secure it. The image of obedience and disobedience is far too
simple for a process of such complexity, and this is true whether one
is writing contracts as a lawyer, opinions as a judge, or rules or
regulations as a legislator or administrator. 4
We might think of this, for example, in connection with the
composition of a marital separation agreement, that is, a contract
between divorcing parties that, subject to judicial approval, will reg
ulate their relations after the divorce decree. This agreement normally
governs all aspects of the dissolution, including property transfers
who gets the house? What about her accrued pension benefits?-as
well as alimony, child support, custody, and the like. It may provide
that insurance be maintained on life or property, require one side or
the other to pay orthodonture bills, school and college tuition, and
4. One might think that one could eliminate the difficulties of interpretation by
publishing a guide to the interpretation of one's statute or contract. But, apart from
all other difficulties, a moment's thought shows that the guide will itself require
interpretation-and how is that to be done? In accordance with a second guide or
a third? What is inescapable is that the drafting of rules or other authoritative texts
is a challenge for an art, and not reducible to a kind of intellectual technology.
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so forth . It is a charter, or constitution, governing the relation between
two people who no longer want to have anything to do with each
other, but who must .
How are we to imagine what we are doing when we draft such
an instrument? Do we want, for example, simply to get the most we
can for our client? Not in the usual sense, for both sides have a great
interest in the workability of the arrangement . If he is impoverished
by the burdens placed upon him, she starved by the inadequacy of
support, or vice versa, they will be back in court, with great costs
to each other and the children . And even if they do not go to court,
serious inequities will affect the children's judgment of both parents,
and, even where there are no children, still affect the actors' judgments
of themselves and each other. The first step, after trying to bring
your client to face the fact that in the real world he is going to get
less than he wants-and that you will not be used to carry on pointless
warfare-may be to try to get him to see that essential fairness is
important to both sides .
One will then face the question how fully the agreement should
resolve every issue: for example, shall exceptions to the visitation
arrangements be spelled out in detail-specifying funerals, college
visits, doctors' appointments, visits from distant relatives, and so
forth? Or should a general standard of reasonableness be employed?
To do the former perfectly is intellectually impossible-you cannot
imagine every contingency-but equally important, undesirable as
an ethical or constitutive matter. Too detailed a code invites rule
bound thought and argument; it defines the husband and wife as
legalistic and creates the circumstances that make it likely for that
definition to be realized. More general language, by contrast, requires
them to have more confidence in their capacity to negotiate and work
things out . It defines them as reasonable people, capable of mutual
adjustment, and creates conditions that invite the realization of that
definition as well .
Of course, language alone does not automatically work as we
wish, or all separation agreements would be quite general in character.
We, and the parties, must judge whether they can stand the respon
sibilities that more general language brings, or whether, by contrast,
they need the specificity of a more legalistic code, at least with respect
to certain issues.
The separation agreement can thus be seen not simply as a set
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of rules to be obeyed o r disobeyed but a s a constitution for a rela
tionship : it creates roles for husband and wife, sometimes even gives
them lines to say, and these may be wise or foolish. And what is so
vivid here as hardly to require comment is also true of other texts,
where it might be harder to see: for example, of a statute establishing
an administrative agency, say the Securities Exchange Commission
or National Labor Relations Board, or of a Supreme Court opinion
regulating police conduct, or of a business contract . How will the
text define the various actors it speaks about and what relation among
them will it create? Will the text specify every contingency, or will
it grant lawmaking and fact-finding power subject to general stan
dards? What are the consequences of one form over another? How
indeed will the text try to see to it that the parties continue to regard
it as the relevant authority? For all of the provisions of the document
are wasted unless they are consulted .
The person doing a good job of drafting the document engages
in an activity of the dramatic imagination, asking herself how her
language might be used, or abused, by one of the parties or another,
how it will function as a charter for this set of human relations. To
do this well brings one to the awareness of the limits of language,
or of any one particular language, and defines one's art as a way of
living with that fact .
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The Rhetoric of Reading Law
Much the same kind of thing can be said of the other main stage of
the process, the reading of the rule or other text. Like writing, this
is an art that cannot be reduced to rules or techniques . Of the many
things that might be said about the process of interpretation, I want
to focus on only one: that just as the writing of such a text entails
the imagining of the world in a certain way, so does its reading . For
example, in reading a statute or constitutional provision, one must
imagine the writer as a person with a certain character inhabiting a
certain context and having a certain set of expectations and under
standings about the process in which he or she is involved . This
would obviously be true in the case of the separation agreement
discussed above, but the same thing is true throughout the law. Think,
for example, of the construction of the United States Constitution .
Are we to imagine this document as a set of authoritarian commands,
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issued in 1787 or 1791, on the assumption that they wholly and
perfectly state something we think of as the wishes of the Framers?
This would be a highly legalistic and time-bound way to think of
this document and, in an extreme form, utterly impossible to live
with. Or are we to imagine the framers of the Constitution as creating
a document full of ambiguity and uncertainty, in the confidence that
other people-those given roles, places, and occasions of speech by
this document-will later resolve the meaning of this language wisely?
Or some third way?
Two competing possibilities of somewhat different kinds, stren
uously argued for in the early years of our national life, were to
conceive of the Constitution as a contract among the states, to be
read as a set of compromises among actors who are still present on
the scene; or as a kind of mystical document, composed not as a
matter of political compromise by still existing states, but as a unified
expression of political wisdom by the Framers, of sanctified memory,
who spoke for a momentarily unified people. 5
The reading of such a text is thus inherently an act of the imag
ination. We often seek to deny this, however, by claiming either that
the meaning of the authoritative language is plain or that the reading
we give it is justified by the intention of the document or its framers.
Actually, part of the meaning of any text is its way of imagining the
world and its actors, present and future; and part of the reading of
that text is the imagining both of it and of the context out of which
it emerged.
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A Poet's Reading

But there is more to it than this, and to suggest how that is so I
want now to turn to another poem, this one in part about the process
of reading . My hope is that this will both illuminate what reading
a text involves and suggest possible standards we might bring to the
reading of legal texts.
5. Perhaps the most explicit example of this conception of the Constitution
appears in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, where he
justifies an extremely generous reading by reference to the character he attributes to
the instrument. For elaboration of this point see James Boyd White, When Words

Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and
Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), chap. 9 .
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The poem I have in mind is John Keats's "Ode on a Grecian
Urn":
Thou still unravished bride of quietness,
Thou foster-child of Silence and slow Time,
Sylvan historian, who canst thus express
A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme:
What leaf-fringed legend haunts about thy shape
Of deities or mortals, or of both,
In Tempe or the dales of Arcady?
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth?
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape?
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?

Copyright © 1994. University of Michigan Press. All rights reserved.

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
Though winning near the goal-yet, do not grieve;
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!
Ah, happy, happy boughs! that cannot shed
Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu;
And, happy melodist, unwearied,
For ever piping songs for ever new;
More happy love! more happy, happy love!
For ever warm and still to be enjoyed,
For ever panting and for ever young;
All breathing human passion far above,
That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloyed,
A burning forehead, and a parching tongue.
Who are these coming to the sacrifice?
To what green altar, 0 mysterious priest,

44

THE RHETORIC OF LAW

Lead'st thou that heifer lowing at the skies,
And all her silken flanks with garlands drest?
What little town by river or sea-shore,
Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel,
Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?
And, little town, thy streets for evermore
Will silent be; and not a soul, to tell
Why thou art desolate, can e'er return.
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0 Attic shape! fair attitude! with brede
Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed;
Thou, silent form! dost tease us out of thought
As doth eternity. Cold Pastoral!
When old age shall this generation waste,
Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou sayst,
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty, -that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know:'
Here the speaker addresses a Grecian urn, imagined to be directly
in front of him, in a series of ways that can be taken as establishing
a set of possibilities for the response to any text or other work of
art. 6 He first defines the urn, for example, as a storyteller: "Sylvan
historian, who canst thus express / A flowery tale more sweetly than
our rhyme." On this view, the urn is a kind of historian (as well as
a competitor); the speaker's response to its work is to ask questions
of it, a bit as if he were in training to become a professor or a
museum guide. "What leaf-fringed legend haunts about thy shape /
Of deities or mortals, or of both, I In Tempe or the dales of Arcady?"
These questions are apparently asked on the assumption that they
have answers of a kind an expert might give; and on the additional
assumption that the answers, when given, will enable the speaker to
locate, and thus in a sense dispose of, the work of art itself.
The speaker seems to contemplate, that is, something like this:
that we might learn that the "legend" is that of the sacrifice of lphi6. My reading is much indebted to Helen Vendler, The Odes of John Keats
(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1983 ).
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genia or the judgment of Paris; if so, we would know all that we
needed to know. We could display our knowledge as we walked
through the museum, placing this object, as we did others, in its
pigeonhole. This is a way of responding to the uncertainty and anx
iety that any work of art generates in its observer. Here the response
is the assertion of the organizing and categorizing mind, the mind
that will locate something on a grid and claim thus to understand
it. The impulse is to evade and dominate the force of the mysterious
by placing it in frameworks of our own. We all have it; professors
build their careers upon it.
But by the end of the first stanza the speaker's tone and emphasis
shift. He goes on: "What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape? /
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy?" Although his expres
sions still have the form of questions, they are of a different kind .
No longer do they seem to imply an answer that will enable him to
categorize and thus dispose of the work; instead they express the
beginning of a kind of merger with the work, a way of imagining
himself into its world .
This is the second kind of response enacted by the speaker. He
allows himself to envy the imagined actors in this world, attributing
to them feelings and a condition that he wished he shared: "For ever
wilt thou love, and she be fair!" As he goes on he becomes increasingly
enraptured by this possibility: "More happy love! more happy, happy
love! / For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd, / For ever panting and
for ever young:' He thus finds in the world represented in the urn
what he thinks of as an ideal experience, more blissful than any he
can have, and seeks to escape to it.
But the very way he characterizes this world unwittingly under
cuts his claim about it: he tells the fair youth that "thou canst not
leave / Thy song," not a wholly favorable condition to say the least;
and goes on to say "never, never canst thou kiss." What he actually
describes is an impossible state for any life we can recognize as human;
if it were possible it would not in any sense of the word be bliss, but
a kind of perpetual frustration . Human life, with its hopes and fears
and memories and despairs, would on such condition of frozenness
be entirely impossible . Although the speaker makes these things plain,
he does not see them himself, or at least not consciously, so swept
up is he in his use of this image as a way of separating himself from
aspects of his own life, a fact he reveals at the end of the third stanza
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when he makes reference to his own experience of the human passion
"That leaves a heart high-sorrowful and cloyed, / A burning forehead,
and a parching tongue:'
If the first response is to dominate the work of art by a profes
sorial inquisition, the second is to imagine it meeting the peculiar
emotional needs of the viewer-here to make it serve as a fantasy
object for escape-and to do so against the very realities the work
insists upon and makes apparent even to the speaker himself.
A third mode of response is represented in stanza four:
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Who are these coming to the sacrifice?
To what green altar, 0 mysterious priest,
Lead'st thou that heifer lowing at the skies,
And all her silken flanks with garlands drest?
What little town by river or sea-shore,
Or mountain-built with peaceful citadel,
Is emptied of this folk, this pious morn?
And, little town, thy streets for evermore
Will silent be; and not a soul, to tell
Why thou art desolate, can e'er return.
Here the speaker is asking questions, but not questions that might
have professorial answers. The questions are addressed to the actors
themselves, and they ask about the meaning of their experience to
them. Instead of assuming and asserting what the experience "must
mean;' as in stanzas two and three, that is, the speaker here acknowl
edges the limits of his knowledge. This acknowledgment of limit
enables him to engage in accurate description-see how much clearer
the scene is than the earlier ones-and at the same time to show
realistic and genuine sympathy with someone else, for he can now
see the imagined figures indeed as "other," and not as a solution to
his own problems. This poem may remind us of "Range-Finding,"
where two different ways of characterizing the same experience were
put before us in such a way as to make us feel at the same time their
inconsistency and their mutual dependency.
The speaker now knows that his questions never will be answered,
and he accordingly assumes the responsibility of responding to the
scene as he has come to it. He achieves, that is, a state in which he
is simultaneously respecting three things: the reality of that which is
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before him; the limits of his own knowledge; and the necessity of his
asserting his own judgment and mind on these conditions. In this he
is acting as I have elsewhere suggested a good translator acts, creating
a world in which both self and other receive recognition, and I wish
to suggest now that this is the way a good judge acts too.
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Two Judicial Readings

I now turn to an actual case decided by the Supreme Court, which
I shall look at as I have suggested law ought to be looked at, as a
world of people talking rather than as a machine. I mean to ask how
we can evaluate the way in which these people talk. To what extent
do the poems by Frost and Keats help to establish standards or models
that we can employ in making this evaluation? Can our judges, that
is, recognize that they are both imagining the world in which the
events they describe took place and, as readers of texts, imagining
those texts and their authors too? Can they recognize that the ways
in which they, and others, imagine these things have deep inconsis
tencies, and perhaps interdependencies as well? Will they compose a
text that brings us to see these things? And, finally, will a way of
imagining the law as itself an imaginative process enable them-or
us-to discipline the mind and feelings in such a way as to attain a
kind of realistic and genuine sympathy that our modes of discourse
usually prevent?
The case is Riverside County v. McLaughlin, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1991, which I have chosen in part for its relative
obscurity. This is not a famous case, but the kind of work the Supreme
Court does all the time.
Riverside addressed the validity of the way in which Riverside
County, California, treats arrested people. In most jurisdictions an
arrested person is entitled to be brought promptly before a judge,
who will decide whether the arrest was valid-in technical terms,
whether it was supported by "probable cause:' Such a hearing is
called a "probable cause determination." If the judge finds probable
cause to exist the suspect can be detained further; if not, he or she
must be discharged. In Riverside, however, this hearing is not held
right away but can be delayed up to two full days, not counting
weekends or holidays. This means, the Supreme Court tells us, that
a person "arrested without a warrant late in the week may in some
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cases be held for as long as five days before receiving a probable
cause determination :'
Riverside has this system not simply for the sake of delay, how
ever, but in order to consolidate the probable cause hearing with
another stage of the criminal process, the arraignment, in which the
defendant is formally charged with a crime and given a chance to
plead guilty or not guilty. The question is whether this consolidation
is permissible if it means that a person can be held in jail several
days merely upon the officer's judgment that he has probably com
mitted a crime. To raise it, a suit was brought by individuals who
had been held in jail for a substantial period without a probable
cause hearing.
In addressing a question of this sort the Supreme Court does not,
of course, simply ask itself whether it thinks the Riverside procedure
wise or salutary, for under our arrangements it does not sit to address
such questions. It can only act as if in its view the procedure violates
a federal statutory or constitutional provision . In this case there is
no relevant statute and the question therefore becomes a constitutional
one, specifically whether this procedure works an "unreasonable sei
zure" of the person of the suspect in violation of the Fourth Amend
ment, which reads in relevant part : "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason
able searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized :'
The question then becomes: Does the Riverside procedure involve
an "unreasonable seizure" of the arrested persons? To begin to think
about this question, the lawyers and judges must imagine many
things: the experience of arrested persons held in jail, unable to pre
sent their case to a judge; the experience of police officers and minor
judicial officials, trying to process arrested defendants in an expe
ditious manner; the Fourth Amendment itself, as a text addressed
from one point of time to another; the Constitution that it is part
of, and the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting it; and earlier
decisions by that same Supreme Court addressing related issues.
To begin with the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as an au
thoritative text : I said above that whenever people disagree about one
thing they must simultaneously affirm their agreement about others,
and in this case that is what happens. All the participants in the legal
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argument conceived of the "reasonable seizure" language of the Fourth
Amendment as insisting upon judicial control of what police officers
do . This can take place either beforehand, when a warrant for arrest
or search is issued, or afterwards, in a probable cause hearing (or in
the case of illegally seized evidence, in a motion to suppress). The
language of the amendment does not require this result, but earlier
decisions, age-old practice, and the language about "warrants" in the
Fourth Amendment itself all support it.
This kind of judicial control of the police is in fact one of the
most important safeguards in the Constitution, doing much to dis
tinguish us from totalitarian regimes. The law is brought to bear by
one agency of government, the judiciary, against another, the exec
utive. Perhaps no constitutional protection is more important than
the right to have the decision of the police to arrest someone subjected
to judicial review, with all that that means, including the presence
of counsel and the press. This is a constitutionalization of the ancient
principles of habeas corpus. All the speakers agree on this much,
and in making these claims they are collectively engaged in imagining
the world a certain way-as including competitive and dangerous
police; neutral and fair. judges; competent lawyers; and a diligent
press-though of course a wholly different act of imagining might,
for some regimes at least, be far more accurate.
How then do the two sides in this case differ? The writer of one
of the two Supreme Court opinions, Justice O' Connor, believes that
the two-day delay is permissible, although she recognizes that even
within two days there might be examples of delay that she would
hold "unreasonable": "delays for the purpose of gathering additional
evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against
the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake." What Justice
O' Connor has at the center of her imaginary visual screen is the
question whether the government is behaving reasonably or unrea
sonably, given all the burdens and constraints to which it is subject.
She imagines the county of Riverside as a bureaucracy, laboring to
do its best with insufficient resources, and subject to the constraint
that if it is to provide more judges, at more hours of the day or
night, in order to make probable cause determinations, this will force
the county either to allocate tax dollars to this activity, away from
some other presumptively valuable one, or to raise taxes.
The opinion on the other side, by Justice Scalia, imagines the
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situation very differently, from the point of view of the arrested
person, and particularly of the innocent person who will be dis
charged when his probable cause determination is heard. Of course
in a great many cases, in all probability the huge majority, the prob
able cause determination will simply result in affirmation of the police
judgment and the continued detention of the suspect. But this opinion
focuses not on this general bureaucratic likelihood, but on the plight
of the wrongly arrested suspect, who is kept in jail longer than he
otherwise would be by virtue of this practice. 7
Justice O'Connor puts the competing issues this way:
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On the one hand, states have a strong interest in protecting
public safety by taking into custody those persons who are
reasonably suspected of having engaged in criminal activity, even
when there has been no opportunity for a prior judicial deter
mination of probable cause. On the other hand, prolonged deten
tion based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly
"imperil [a] suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships."
This language represents an imaginative choice to which the suspect
might respond not by denying the public interest as it is here stated,
that of detaining people "reasonably" suspected of crime, but by
saying that this interest of the county should be conceived of very
differently, namely as an interest in failing to provide prompt deter
minations of the propriety of an arrest. Likewise, the suspect would
find the characterization of his own interest, and the impact of jail
on him, woefully understated by this language, which fails to put
any value at all on the deprivation of liberty as such, or the humil
iation and danger of life in a jail.
There is another question on which the two sides divide, and
that is how to read an earlier text, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103
(1975), which both regard as a central precedent. In this case the
Court invalidated Florida procedures under which arrested persons
"could remain in police custody for 30 days or more without a judicial
7. Of course even for the correctly arrested person it is important that this
judgment be reviewed promptly, for the meaning of the detention is very different
after the police judgment has been judicially affirmed.
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determination of probable cause:' The Court held that the states "must
provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a
condition for any significant pre-trial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or"the key language-"promptly after arrest." The Court was in effect
saying that arrests, unlike searches, could generally be valid without
prior judicial warrant-a rule justified by the likelihood that in many
cases the opportunity to make the arrest would disappear if the
policeman left the scene in order to obtain a warrant-but that the
judicial judgment must be made "promptly" after the arrest.
The textual question thus becomes: What does the word
"promptly" in this opinion mean? One way to think of Gerstein is
that it creates, or validates, for arrests, an exception to a general
principle that police intrusions must be justified to judicial officers
before they occur, through the warrant mechanism. In this event,
one would think that "promptly" meant as soon as an officer could
find a magistrate after the arrest.
But there is language in Gerstein that supports a different way
of thinking of it, in which the Court speaks about its sensitivity to
its own role and its reluctance to impose a single model of criminal
procedure on the states:

Copyright © 1994. University of Michigan Press. All rights reserved.

There is no single preferred pre-trial procedure, and the nature
of the probable cause determination usually will be shaped to
accord with the state's pre-trial procedure viewed as a whole . . . .
[W]e recognize the desirability of flexibility in experimentation
by the States.
The Court goes on to give examples: one state might establish the
probable cause determination as a separate proceeding, another might
incorporate it into the procedure for setting bail, another might
choose another mechanism. This is a way of imagining the Court
not simply as an interpreter of the requirements of the Fourth Amend
ment, but as an actor in a constitutional system, one of whose great
merits is variety and diversity of result, charged with the duty of
articulating the general standards to which a wide variety of systems
will be held.
In Riverside Justice O' Connor focuses upon this second way of
conceiving of the Court, finds authority for it in Gerstein, and holds
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the Riverside procedure valid, as one among many permissible forms
of experimentation. She justifies this in part because the Riverside
procedure integrates two stages of the criminal process-the probable
cause determination and the arraignment-as specifically contem
plated in Gerstein. Justice Scalia sees as the salient points in Gerstein
the requirement of judicial supervision, the acknowledgment of con
tinuing harm while incarceration continues, and the presumption that
there should be a judicial determination before the harm is inflicted.
Under this way of imagining things "promptly" means right away,
not when bureaucratically feasible. 8
My point is not to suggest that one way of imagining and acting
is right, the other wrong, but that in the process of legal argument
and in a good opinion-two ways of imagining the world are both
present, in tension with and opposition to each other, much as the
various ways of imagining the world are present, in tension and
opposition, in the poems we have read. This implies a standard for
judging an opinion-that it reflect what can be said the other way
and suggests as well that for the law as for poetry truth lies not in
any set of propositions but in the tensions that exist among competing
versions of the world.
The task of the lawyers in this case is to present alternative and
coherent ways of imagining at least the following things: the trans
action to which it speaks (the delayed incarceration of suspects by
Riverside County); the Fourth Amendment, which speaks to that; its
historical context; earlier cases (of which I have in fact selected only
one); and the role of the Supreme Court itself. When they have
finished, they have articulated differing possibilities for thought and
speech in this context, in the course of which they have of necessity
affirmed much about which they do not and cannot disagree. The
effect is to give the Court competing ways of envisioning this event,
8. There is still another level at which the two sides imagine the world differently,
and that has to do with the relevance of legal practice at the time the Constitution
was framed. Under the common law it was the general rule that a person must be
brought before a magistrate very quickly indeed, or as soon as possible, after his
arrest . The side favoring the suspect sees this practice as deeply influencing the
meaning that should be given to the Fourth Amendment. The other side sees this
practice as pretty much irrelevant. For them the Fourth Amendment articulates stan
dards of a general sort that are to be applied in new particular circumstances without
special regard for the practices of what are now bygone eras.
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and their own role in it; when the Court acts, if it does not do so
unanimously, it will articulate these competing ways itself, making
them-both of them-part of the law.
The role of the Court in this rhetorical and literary system is to
fuse reading and writing, and both as imaginative activities: first in
the reading of the texts of the law-constitutional, statutory, and
judicial-that bear upon the case; and then in the composition of a
text that will connect that reading with the events of the world, as
these are imagined too: the experience of suspects and officers both,
the relation between the state and federal systems, and so forth. At
every point the Court is faced with a choice of language, and its
choices in the end cannot be harmonized. One way of imagining and
speaking will be chosen over another. The activity of law thus entails
the tragic necessity of occluding voices and erasing experiences. It is
unavoidable. Yet in a case like Riverside the dissent may answer the
opinion of the majority in such a way as to give their joint work
the work of the whole Court-a quality missing in either opinion
standing alone, the tension between different ways of imagining the
world that brings both of them to the surface of attention.
In what spirit, by what art, is this to be done? Here too the poet
can perhaps help us, showing how to make a text that includes
competing languages, competing ways of imagining the world, in a
way that undermines the claims of absoluteness otherwise at work
in the judgment and its explanation. One test of judicial quality would
then be inclusion, acknowledgment of loss and cost; another, humil
ity, the degree to which the court recognizes its own intellectual and
imaginative limits. Perhaps the best way to think of the good judge
is as a good translator, as one who mediates between inconsistent
ways of talking and tries to give each a place in his text, even as he
recognizes that, to reach a decision at all, one of them must be
accorded priority. The life of the mind that does this is not so different,
after all, from the life of "Range-Finding" or "A Narrow Fellow:'
Or, using Keats, we might ask if the judge can attain something
like the balance achieved in the last stages of that poem: if he can
see the litigants as different from him and from each other; as people
about whose experience he can ask questions, but always with the
knowledge that they will never be fully answered, and that the barrier
between his mind and theirs will thus never entirely dissolve; as those
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with whom he can thus have a real and disciplined sympathy; yet
recognize as well that he must describe their experience, and do so
in language; and that whatever language he uses will exclude another.
The art of mind and judgment called for, then, is one in which
opposing accounts and feelings and terms are held in the mind, or
in the text, at once, each limiting the other.
If so, there may be seen-as Owen Barfield in particular has
said9-a deep harmony in structure between the legal and the po
etic process, the legal process enacting slowly, explicitly, and self
consciously, what the poem achieves much more quickly, namely a
sense that against one way of conceiving of the world and functioning
within it is always posed another. Just as Robert Frost's way of
thinking of the spider and the flower and the butterfly was first
asserted, and then challenged, or Emily Dickinson's way of thinking
of the snake, so too in the law one way of imagining a piece of the
world, including individual persons, public institutions, and great
documents from the past, is poised against another.
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Imagination and Po wer

Does this way of looking at law disregard the fact that the law is a
medium through which power is exercised, by one person over
another, or by one group or class over another? I think not; indeed
it is precisely because the law does involve the exercise of power that
it is so important how it is written, how it is read, and how it is
imagined. In every society power is exercised by some people over
others; but one can distinguish among these societies and among the
institutions through which that is done. There are significant differ
ences, for example, between the rule of law, even in the imperfect
form in which we know it, and rule by the Imperial Guard, say, or
the Red Army, or the Mafia. What matters is not that all forms of
government are species of power, but what differentiates them. My
own interest here is in beginning to work out a way to analyze and
evaluate particular exercises of power by judges.
The claim that the law is power, nothing but power, is as false
9. Owen Barfield, "Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction," in The Rediscovery
of Meaning and Other Essays (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press,
1977} , 45 .
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as the opposed claim, that the law-or the judiciary-is perfectly
just or perfectly neutral, which is of course impossible. A system by
which human beings decide matters of deep importance to other
people will always be one in which the deciders bring their own
values and experiences of life to the process; they will always function
out of particular cultural places, out of particular psychological and
emotional structures, which will do much to shape how they work.
But these exercises of power will be expressed and enacted in different
ways by different minds; they will be given much of their meaning
by the cultural forces through which they work; and the critical
analysis of these expressions and forms is a central element of legal
thought.
To imagine the law as a rhetorical and literary process may help us
to see each moment in the law differently: the composition of rules
and authoritative texts; their construction by others; and the process
of legal thought and argument itself. It leads to a different conception
of the teaching of law and may help the practitioner conceive of its
practice differently too. It defines the lawyer's life as involving a
perpetual interaction both between language and reality, and among
languages as well, for law is a language into which other languages
must continually be translated . In the practice of law, so conceived,
there is the perpetual interplay of the particular and the general, of
theory and practice; and one can imagine as well a continuity with
the rest of life.
I said at the beginning that I was interested in the way in which
we imagine law. I have suggested that we imagine the law as a process
of imagination itself, as a set of occasions on which people imagine
their world into being. In this it can be connected with what we do
in the rest of life; and the poems by Frost, Dickinson, and Keats do
much to suggest standards by which we might learn to do this better.

